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Motivation
The research question:
Does emission permit trading cause inefficiency,
when production causes simultaneous localized
and global externality problems (e.g. smog and
global warming)?
I examine this question in a simple framework where a
benevolent international common agency determines
emission permits.
In Palokangas (2015), I derive the same results in an
extended case where the common agency is
self-interested, elected by the countries, and subject to
lobbying by the countries (cf. Dixit et al. 1997).
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Literature 1
Caplan and Silva (2005) examine joint tradable permits
when pollutants cause regional and global externalities.
They find that joint domestic and commonly international
permit markets are Pareto efficient.
Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) consider emission
trading when the governments set their national emission
targets individually and grant emission permits for the
domestic firms. They find that emission permit trading
increases emissions and decreases efficiency.
In contrast to these articles, however, I assume that there
is a benevolent international common agency that issues
emission permits.
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Literature 2
Montgomery (1972), Shiell (2003) and MacKenzie et al.
(2008) consider the redistributive effects of the initial
allocation of emission permits. I use the representative
household framework to ignore all such redistributive
effects.
I ignore the effects of market imperfections (cf. Hintermann
2011 and Meunier 2011), and assume that there is a
competitive market for emission permits.
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The economy
The economy consists of a large number (“continuum") of
countries j ∈ [0,1] that produce the same good from a
single source of emissions (called hereafter energy, for
convenience) and fixed local resources (e.g. land and
labor).
The extraction costs of energy are ignored, for simplicity.
The international common agency grants emission permits.
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Energy and pollution
The use of energy causes both global (called global
warming) and localized externality (called smog).
Global externality is represented by a single index M,
which is called global pollution, for convenience.
I define the energy inputs mj and emission permits Mj for
countries j ∈ [0,1] in terms of global pollution. Then, total
emissions
∫ 1
0 mkdk are equal total emission permits:∫ 1
0
mkdk = M =
∫ 1
0
Mjdj .
Because the use of energy mj causes locally smog nj , the
former can be used as a proxy of the latter as follows:
nj = mj .
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Production
The representative firm in country j produces the quantity
fj of the final good from energy mj and fixed factors:
fj(mj), f ′j > 0, f
′′
j < 0, fj(0) = 0.
At the same time, in country j , smog nj causes abatement
costs gj according to an increasing and convex function
gj(nj), g′j > 0, g
′′
j > 0, gj(0) = 0.
Total consumption c is equal to aggregate output
∑
j fj
minus abatement costs
∑
j gj throughout all countries:
c .=
∫ 1
0
fj(mj)dj −
∫ 1
0
gj(nj)dj =
∫ 1
0
[fj(mj)− gj(nj)]dj .
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Households
To avoid distributional considerations, I consider the
representative household of the whole economy.
Consumption c increases and global pollution M
decreases household utility u according to the function
u(c,M), uc
.
=
∂u
∂c
> 0, uM
.
=
∂u
∂M
< 0, u strictly concave.
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Welfare maximization
Nontraded emission permits determine energy inputs
mj = Mj .
The international common agency maximizes household
welfare u(c,M) by emission permits mj = Mj subject to
global emissions M =
∫ 1
0 Mjdj
smog nj = mj for j ∈ [0,1]
total consumption c =
∫ 1
0 [fj (mj )− gj (nj )]dj .
Tapio Palokangas, Univ. of Helsinki Emission Permit Management with Simultaneous Localized and Global Externality Problems
Literature
The model
Nontraded permits
Traded permits
The role of asymmetry
Pareto optimum
The welfare maximization leads to the the Pareto optimum
Mp, cp and mpj for j ∈ [0,1]:
Mp =
∫ 1
0
mpj dj , c
p =
∫ 1
0
[fj(m
p
j )− gj(mpj )]dj ,
f ′j (m
p
j ) = g
′
j (m
p
j )−
um(cp,Mp)
uc(cp,Mp)
for j ∈ [0,1],
where
f ′j the marginal product of energy
g′ the marginal costs of smog
−um/uc the marginal disutility of global warming, in
terms of consumption.
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Emission permit trading
With emission permit trading, the representative firm in
country j ∈ [0,1] can sell its excess supply of permits,
Mj −mj , or buy its excess demand for permits, mj −Mj , in
the competitive market at the price p.
The profit of that firm is
Πj
.
= fj(mj) + (Mj −mj)p,
where
fj(mj) income from production
Mj −mj the net supply of emission permits
p the international price for emission permits
(Mj −mj)p net revenue from emission permits.
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Total consumption
Noting abatement costs g(nj), the revenue of country j is
pij = Πj − g(nj) = fj(mj)− g(nj) + (Mj −mj)p.
Given this, total consumption is equal to total revenue:
c =
∫ 1
0
[fk (mk )− gk (nk )]dk =
∫ 1
0
pikdk .
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The extensive form game
There is an extensive form game with the following stages:
(i) The common agency sets emission permits Mj for countries
j ∈ [0,1] to maximize the household welfare u(c,M) by
emission permits mj = Mj subject to
global emissions M =
∫ 1
0 Mjdj
smog nj = mj for j ∈ [0, 1]
total consumption c =
∫ 1
0 pik (Mk ,M)dk .
(ii) The international price p for emission permits adjusts to
clear the market for these.
(iii) Firm j uses energy mj to maximize its profit
Πj
.
= fj (mj ) + (Mj −mj )p.
This game is solved in reverse order.
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Stage (iii): the behavior of firms
The firm in country j maximizes its profit
Πj
.
= fj(mj) + (Mj −mj)p
by energy input mj , given the emission permits Mj and the
price p for those.
This yields the equilibrium profit and the inverse demand
function for energy as follows:
Πj = maxmj
[fj(mj) + (Mj −mj)p],
p = f ′j (mj) with
dp
dmj
.
= f ′′j < 0.
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Stage (ii): the market for emission permits
Differentiating the inverse demand function, and noting the
smog nj = mj , one obtains pollution nj and energy input mj
as a function of the price:
nj = mj = Nj(p) with N ′j
.
= 1/f ′′j < 0.
Total emissions then become
M =
∫ 1
0
nkdk =
∫ 1
0
Nk (p)dk .
Differentiating this equation totally yields the price as a
function of total emissions:
p(M), p′ =
(∫ 1
0
N ′kdk
)−1
< 0.
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Stage (ii): the market for emission permits; 1
Plugging this price function into the demands for energy
nj = mj = Nj(p) yields smog nj as a function of total
emissions M in all countries j ∈ [0,1]:
nj(M)
.
= Nj(p(M)) with
n′j
.
= N ′j p
′ =
(∫ 1
0
N ′kdk
)−1
N ′j ∈ [0,1].
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Stage (ii): the market for emission permits; 2
Given the price and energy-demand functions, the revenue
of country j is a function of total emissions M and the
emission permits for that country, Mj :
pij(Mj ,M)
.
= max
mj
[
fj(mj)− gj
(
nj(M)
)
+ (Mj −mj)p(M)
]
with
∂pij
∂Mj
= p and
∂pij
∂M
= −g′j n′j + (Mj −mj)p′.
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Stage (i): the behavior of the common agency
The common agency maximizes household utility u(c,M)
subject to
global emissions M =
∫ 1
0 Mjdj
smog nj (M) for j ∈ [0,1]
total consumption c =
∫ 1
0 pik (Mk ,M)dk .
This leads to the first-order conditions:
0 =
1
uc(c,M)
du(c,M)
dMj
=
∂c
∂Mj
+
um
uc
=1︷︸︸︷
∂M
∂Mj
= −
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk + f
′
j +
um
uc
for j ∈ [0,1].
This implies that terms f ′j (mj) are equal for all j ∈ [0,1],
which violates the first of the Pareto optimality conditions.
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The first result
Proposition
Emission permit trading decreases welfare by equalizing the
marginal product of energy, f ′j (mj), throughout all countries
j ∈ [0,1].
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The case of identical countries
If the countries are fully identical,
mj = nj = m, fj(m) = f (m) and gj(n) = g(n) for j ∈ [0,1].
then it follows that Nj(p) = N(p) and n′j = 1 for j ∈ [0,1].
This leads to the Pareto optimum:
0 = −
∫ 1
0
g′(m)n′kdk + f
′ +
um
uc
= −g′(m) + f ′(m) + um
uc
.
Thus, the inefficiency of emission permit trading is due to
the heterogeneity of the countries.
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The effect of emission permit trading
Next, to consider the effect of emission permit trading on
total emissions, I introduce a parameter β so that β = 0
holds true without mj = Mj and β = 1 with emission permit
trading mj 6= Mj .
By this variable, I can combine the equilibrium conditions
without and with trading as follows:
0 = −β
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk + f
′
j − (1− β)g′j +
um
uc
for j ∈ [0,1].
The effect of β on emission permits Mj is first derived on
the assumption that β is continuous in the limit [0,1]. Then,
by the mean value theorem, the result is extended for the
discrete choice β ∈ {0,1}.
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Some definitions
The damage of smog in country j – i.e. the decrease of
income in that country due to smog nj – is g′j .
The localized technology in country j is called relatively
clean, if the damage in country j , g′j , is smaller than the the
weighed average of the damages of all countries,
g′j <
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk ,
and relatively dirty, if the damage g′j is greater than that
average,
g′j >
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk .
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The second result
Assuming the equilibrium unique and differentiating the
combined equilibrium condition totally yields the result
dMj
dβ
< 0 ⇔ g′j <
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk .
This can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition
With the introduction of emission permit trading, the common
agency provides less permits to countries with relatively clean
localized technology (i.e. g′j <
∫ 1
0 g
′
kn
′
kdk holds), and more
permits to countries with relatively dirty localized technology
(i.e. g′j >
∫ 1
0 g
′
kn
′
kdk holds).
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Interpretation
The use of non-traded emission permits lead to Pareto
optimum: the marginal product of energy is equal to the
marginal cost of smog plus the disutility of global warming
in terms of consumption.
Emission permit trading restricts the common agency’s
policy set by equalizing the marginal product of energy for
all countries.
Welfare decreases in that case, because the common
agency provides less permits to countries with relatively
clean and more permits to those with relatively dirty
localized technology.
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